Table of Contents - Issue 4 by Chicago-Kent Law Review
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 74 




Table of Contents - Issue 4 
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Chicago-Kent Law Review, Table of Contents - Issue 4, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. i (2000). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol74/iss4/1 
This Front Matter is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons 




VOLUME 74 2000 NUMBER 4
CONTENTS
SYMPOSIUM ON
LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE EMOTIONS
SYMPOSIUM EDITOR
HEIDI Li FELDMAN
FOREWORD: LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND
THE EMOTIONS Heidi Li Feldman 1423
PRUDENCE, BENEVOLENCE, AND NEGLIGENCE:
VIRTUE ETHICS AND TORT LAW Heidi Li Feldman 1431
In this Article, Feldman aims to remedy a lapse in tort scholarship on the negli-
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authority and the worry that the prescriptions generated by juries' thought experi-
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authority in the tort context and argues that we have no noncircular reason to care if
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suggestions, this Article explores the mechanisms and consequences of empathy. It is
argued that, by allowing one to "try on" new emotional takes on the world, empathy
can expand a person's evaluative perspective in important ways. This can render an
agent susceptible to forms of evaluative experience and ultimately evaluative knowl-
edge that might otherwise be unavailable to her.
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Rapaport offers a critique of the contemporary retributivist approach to execu-
tive clemency and seeks to stimulate reappraisal and development of what she calls
the "redemptive" perspective. The retributivist view of clemency and of criminal jus-
tice generally is reductionist: Retributivists take both the justification and measure of
punishment to be just desert. A richer account of clemency recognizes that criminal
justice has a complex set of goals. Rapaport argues that, while there is clearly a sense
in which justice and clemency-as-retributively-undeserved-lenity are antithetical, an
account of criminal justice rich enough to reflect our traditions and practices prior to
the neo-retributive retreat finds a place for clemency-as-lenity.
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Legal scholars have expressed a growing interest in the power of social norms.
They now frequently argue that people obey the law even in the absence of legal
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A close connection exists between cognitive biases and the idea of "myth." Peo-
ple believe things with far more confidence than they should, which many psycholo-
gists and social theorists attribute to the need to suppress anxiety. This Essay explores
this idea within the world of lawyers and clients, especially in the business setting,
showing how personal mythologies can blunt ethical mandates and how storytelling
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explain nonrational market behavior. This Article argues that cognitive psychology
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